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Abstract 
In South Africa’s apartheid regime a white minority controlled the black African majority from 1948 until 
1994, creating income and wealth inequalities between the different races that linger today. This paper 
uses data from the 2008 and 2014 National Income Dynamics Survey (NIDS) to understand income 
inequalities within and between racial categories, to examine how different income sources contribute to 
overall income inequality, and to study how the interaction between race and poverty shapes the 
inequality between African households when decomposing into subgroups above and below the poverty 
line. For this study, I use Gini coefficients to measure inequality. My findings demonstrate that Africans 
have continually earned less than their white counterparts, with an increase in inequality in all racial 
groups except for Africans. The Gini coefficient for government income in both years is relatively low, 
suggesting that it serves as redistributive income. Finally, for African households, wage income is a big 
contributor to the overall inequality, while government income can be seen more clearly as a redistributive 
source of income. This has implications for future government policies designed to address inequality. 
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 South Africa’s apartheid regime separated society with a racial caste system in which a 
white minority controlled the Black African1 majority from 1948 until 1994. At its core, 
apartheid was an economic system designed to empower whites while preventing Africans from 
achieving above a certain income level and professional status. Apartheid ended in 1994 after a 
series of negotiations between the ruling National Party and the African National Congress 
(ANC) facilitated the first democratic elections. To dismantle apartheid’s legacy, the ANC 
pursued an economic strategy of Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR), which 
operated on a macroeconomic scale to increase the government’s capacity for future social 
expenditure and take aim at the rampant wealth and income inequalities (Bhorat and Kanbur, 
2006). Despite governmental welfare measures and redistribution efforts meant to reduce the 
legacy of apartheid, overall income inequality in South Africa rose between 1993 and 2008 
(Leibbrandt et al. 2010). 
This paper uses data from the 2008 and 2014 National Income Dynamics Survey (NIDS) 
to understand income inequalities within and between racial categories, to examine how different 
income sources contribute to overall income inequality, and to study how the interaction between 
race and poverty shapes income inequality. Gini coefficients serve as the measures of income 
inequality, making this paper easily comparable with the existing literature on South African 
income inequality.  
This paper’s goals correspond to the results section’s three components. The first 
component examines the mean incomes and Lorenz curves by race for 2008 and 2014. This 
provides an overview of inter-race inequalities by partially replicating the study done by Janina 
Hundenborn, Murray Leibbrandt, and Ingrid Woodard (2016) based on another study by Murray 
Leibbrandt, Arden Finn, and Ingrid Woolard (2012) that analyzed inequality levels in different 
income sources for the years 1993 and 2008. I use similar methods of Hundenborn et al. (2016) 
to extend the analysis of Leibbrandt et al. (2012) for the same population to a 2014 data set, 
creating mean income variables and Gini coefficients by race. Lorenz curves subsequently 
represent the Gini coefficient graphically for each race in the years 2008 and 2014. The results 
section’s second component decomposes Gini coefficients by income source for the overall 
population in each year. This again serves as an extension of work by Hunderborn et al. (2016) 
and Liebbrandt et al. (2012), the inclusion of rent and agriculture contributing to their existing 
literature in this thorough examination of sources of income inequality. The final component 
examines the Gini coefficients for the African populations above and below the poverty line in 
2008 and 2014. This third component is similar to Murray Leibbrandt, Arden Finn, and Ingrid 
Woolard’s (2000) decomposition of rural African subgroups above and below the poverty line 
for 1993, and is especially useful for a targeted perspective that discerns the largest inequalities: 
those between households above and below the poverty level.  
 My analysis shows an increase in mean incomes from 2008 to 2014 for all racial 
categories. These results are consistent with and without the addition of imputed rent and 
agricultural earnings2. White mean earnings significantly exceeded that of all other races while 
Africans earned the least in both years: reflecting the legacy of apartheid. The highest rate of 
growth in racial mean incomes between 2008 and 2014 was for African households, suggesting 
that government redistribution and affirmative action programs achieved at least some degree of 
 
1 The Black majority in South Africa will be referred to as “African” to be consistent with similar literature. 
2 These variables were initially excluded so as to replicate and extend the work of Leibbrandt et al. (2012) After the 
successful replication, I use a total income variable including imputed rent and agriculture.  
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success. My analysis also reveals that inequality within the African racial category remained 
consistent over time, while intra-race inequality increased amongst non-Africans between 2008 
and 2014. Notably, the White3 population experienced the largest increase in inequality from 
2008 to 2014.  
In the second component of the results section, the decomposition of Gini coefficients by 
income source, wages were consistently the highest contributor to overall income and maintained 
a high Gini coefficient in both 2008 and 2014. This suggests that wage income significantly 
contributed to the high Gini coefficient for overall income. In contrast, government income only 
accounted for a small share of overall income and had a low Gini coefficient, indicating that the 
government transferred small amounts of money to many households at a relatively equal rate in 
redistributive efforts.  
The final component of the results section includes the decomposition of African 
households into samples of those households below and above the poverty line. This reveals that 
wage income inequality was a high contributor to within-race inequality during 2008 and 2014, 
especially for the African subgroup above the poverty line. Additionally, government income 
served as a redistributive income source during both years and within both subgroups, as 
evidenced by the negative elasticity between government income and the overall income. 
This paper contributes to existing literature such as Hundenborn et al. (2016) who use 
data from the 2008 and 2014 waves of the NIDS and find that differences in labor income 
explained a large portion of overall inequality in the South African population. The data from 
Hundenborn et al. (2016) suggest that despite government efforts to decrease inequality, it 
remains largely constant between the two years. Unlike the paper by Hundenborn et al. (2016) 
and similar to Leibbrandt et al. (2012), my paper examines racially disaggregated patterns in 
inequality. I study inequality through the lens of race to attempt to understand the complex 
legacy of inequality left by apartheid that is reflected differently within and between the different 
racial categories. My paper also explores a decomposition of the African population in particular, 
as Africans suffered systemic discrimination under apartheid (Lowenberg, 1989) and thus have 
much to overcome in the modern legacy of apartheid (Kingdon and Knight, 2004).  
In Section 2, I will discuss a brief background of the economic inequality behind 
apartheid, followed by an exploration of data and methodology in Section 3. Section 4 is 
dedicated to analyzing the data, beginning in Section 4.1 with a broad income and inequality 
comparison for 2008 and 2014. Section 4.2 decomposes inequality by income source for 2008 
and 2014, followed by Section 4.3, which decomposes Gini coefficients for African households 
above and below the poverty line in 2008 and 2014. Section 5 concludes the paper with a 
discussion of the overall findings and potential future avenues of study.  
 
2. Background 
By the time apartheid officially began in 1948, labor laws and land restrictions that 
prevented Black Africans from advancing had been in place for years. The economic boom from 
World War II had faded, and with many injured white Europeans returning home to South 
Africa, the government took increasing measures to economically protect the white minority at 
the expense of the Africans (Lowenberg, 1989).  
 
3 When capitalized, “White” refers to the racial category used in the National Income Dynamics Survey and in 
apartheid-era legislation. This is used for the sake of consistency with other studies, that have continued the use of 
apartheid-era racial designations.  
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Africans were sent to homelands4 and resettlement camps.5 The government seized 
Africans’ land, turning it over to white-owned farms. Homelands faced extreme overcrowding, 
and the poor farmland prevented agricultural subsistence, exacerbating economic inequality and 
hindering any efforts at economic independence (Nattrass and Seekings, 2005). After being 
forced onto homelands, Africans found their South African citizenship revoked, and became 
unable to qualify for government aid.6 
Pass laws made it illegal for Africans to even be in a White neighborhood without a pass 
to prove they worked nearby, further restricting Africans. Education above the level necessary 
for unskilled (low-paying) work was outlawed for Africans, and they were prevented from 
joining labor unions, a staple of the South African labor force. These factors combined to create 
an effective limit on the amount African workers could earn, as they could not acquire the 
education or union memberships necessary to perform skilled labor (Mariotti, 2012). The most 
common sector for Africans to work in became mining, which relied heavily on a migrant labor 
system to deter illegal unions and keep wages low (Wilson, 2001). 
As a result of all the measures taken to ensure white economic supremacy, shortly after 
the end of apartheid in 1994 an estimated 54.4% of all African households were in poverty 
compared to 41.4 % of all households in the overall population7 (Leibbrandt et al., 2000). The 
new government run by the ANC established a hefty social welfare program and integrated 
schools, workforces, and labor unions in hopes of reducing racial inequalities and untangling the 
economic ramifications of apartheid (Bhorat, 2006).  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
This paper analyzes and decomposes Gini coefficients for different sources of income 
and different populations/subgroups in South Africa, looking specifically to understand 
inequalities within racial groups and how these inequalities have changed between 2008 and 
2014. 
To measure inequality I used Gini coefficients, as they are the most common metric of 
inequality, allowing for comparisons between this paper’s findings and those in the rest of the 
literature. Gini coefficients for income are calculated using a Lorenz curve which plots the 
cumulative percentage of income on the y-axis against the cumulative percentage of the 
population on the x-axis. A 45-degree line represents a completely equal distribution of income. 
To construct the Lorenz curves used to analyze the Gini coefficients for this paper, I used the 
Stata extension glcurve (Jenkins, Stephen P., and Philippe Van Kerm, 2004). The Gini 




      (1)  
where A is the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line and B is the area between 
the Lorenz curve and the axis (Haughton, J. and S. R. Khandker, 2010). The closer a Gini 
 
4 Homelands, also known as Bantustans, were regions with poor natural resources the South African government of 
apartheid forced Africans to relocate to. Africans separated by tribal identity, and after relocating were no longer 
able to claim South African citizenship. Though the homelands were on paper independent from the South African 
government, in reality they relied heavily on the government for jobs, resources and money.  
5 Resettlement camps were established on the edge of homelands as South Africa continued to relocate Africans and 
ran out of space.  
6 Some governmental policies went so far as to claim that offering pensions or other aid to Africans would be a 
violation of cultural tradition (Nattrass et al., 2005). 
7 In these calculations, African households composed 71% of all households.  
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coefficient is to zero, the more equal the distribution of income is; however, the closer it is to 
one, the more unequal the distribution is. It is widely used as a measure of income inequality 
because, as Haughton et al. (2010) explain, it satisfies the necessities of mean independence 
(multiplying incomes does not change the measurement), population size independence 
(measurement is independent of population size, all else equal), symmetry (two people switching 
incomes would not change the measurement), and Pigou-Dalton Transfer sensitivity (shifting 
income from rich to poor reduces the measurement). This paper derives Gini coefficients for 
each race and income category using the extension of ineqdecgini in Stata (Jenkins, Stephen P., 
2019).  
The coefficients calculated using ineqdecgini were then used to compare levels of inter-
race and intra-race inequality (defining each race as it was categorized in the NIDS questionnaire 
using the following categories: African8, Coloured9, Asian/Indian, and White). These racial 
categories were established during apartheid, and have continued in use through the modern-day. 
Gini coefficients have been used to compare levels of inequality between and within racial 
groups, most notably for this paper and Leibbrandt et al. (2012). 
Decomposing Gini coefficients by race or income source allows for clearer inspection of 
the sources of inequalities and whether economic divides are worsening between or within like 
racial groups or economic categories. In this study, I follow the methodology of Leibbrandt et al. 
(2000) who used a derivation by Stark, Taylor, and Yitzhaki (1986) to decompose the Gini 
Coefficient using the sgini Stata command (Van Kerm, 2020): 
  𝐺 = ∑𝐾𝑘=1 𝑆 𝑘𝐺 𝑘𝑅 𝑘     (2)  
Where Sk is defined as the share of income source k of total income; Gk specifically measures the 
inequality of how income source k is distributed, and finally Rk reflects the correlation between 
the Gini coefficient of the income source with the Gini coefficient of the total income (a positive 
correlation would mean that as the Gini coefficient within the income source rises, so does the 
Gini coefficient for the overall income).  
Elasticity, or the responsiveness of the Gini coefficient to a 1% increase in a particular 
income source k, can be derived from a decomposition using the components seen in Gini 
coefficient measurements. As expressed in a derivation by Schmit, Boisvert, and Tauer (2001), 
the equation for elasticity reads:  
 𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 = (
𝑆 𝑘𝐺 𝑘𝑅 𝑘
𝐺 𝑘
) − 𝑆 𝑘    (3)  
For all measurements this paper uses derived data from the nationally representative 
panel NIDS. This panel started in 2008 and follows a similar methodology to that of the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics in the United States. Households surveyed in 2008 were followed 
across time. To date,  five waves have been conducted (2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2017). My 
analysis uses the 2008 and 2014 rounds of survey data collection. Each individual selected for 
the survey answered both an individual questionnaire and a household questionnaire. These were 
matched with household ID numbers to sort the information and match households together for 
aggregate income variables.  
 
8 In racial categories established by apartheid and used in NIDS, “African” was used to describe all Black people. 
9 Unlike in the U.S., where “Coloured” is a racial slur, in South Africa “Coloured” is used as a racial category. The 
term was established during apartheid to include a range of people, most generally those who did not fall into the 
category of “White,” “African” or  “Indian/Asian.” This group includes those descended from the Khoisan tribe, 
those with mixed heritage (typically White and African as a result of the colonization that occurred), and those 
related to Cape Malay community.  
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NIDS sorted income information into seven income categories: labor market income, 
government grants, investment income, subsistence agriculture income, imputed rent for owner-
occupied housing, remittances, and other government income (Brophy et al., NIDS User 
Manual). The most important income source is labor market income, which consists of wages, 
first/second jobs, self-employment, bonuses, and other smaller variables. Government income 
was split into two variables: the first labeled “government income” includes grants and pensions, 
while the second, “other income,” is strictly work-related government income (unemployment 
insurance and worker’s compensation). Investment income accounts for interest, rent, and private 
pensions/annuities, while imputed rent accounts for the imputed income gained from owner-
occupied housing (Brophy et al., NIDS User Manual). Finally, the remittance category 
acknowledges the historical importance of money received from family/friends as a form of 
income during apartheid as a means of subsistence in resettlement camps and homelands 
(Nattrass et al., 2005) and its persistence as an income source even in the years after apartheid. 
Subsistence agriculture (survival and income off of farming) has become possible with the end of 
apartheid, as Africans have once again been able to own land. A final collective “total household 
income” serves as the aggregate of these individual parts without the imputed rent. 
Gini coefficients unless otherwise noted are computed using total income measures with 
imputed rent and agriculture, calculated per capita and deflated to 2012 nominal rand, the South 
African currency, to allow for comparison. Weights as outlined in Wittenberg (2009) were 
applied unless otherwise stated to match the demographics of NIDS to that of South Africa (as 
calculated in the census). Because many of these weights have been and continue to be updated 
with further waves and census information, the data in my study is a snapshot reflective of the 
currently available weights.  
To only analyze respondents for the 2014 wave of NIDS, 162 of the 11,895 households in 
the derived household data were dropped from the dataset. Those 162 respondents did not 
provide income data in the individual survey thus making household calculations impossible--
leaving this paper with data for 11,732 households. To find percentages of households receiving 
a source of income, dummy variables were created, with missing data values indicating that the 
responder did not receive the form of income. This was done because before answering how 
much the respondent earned from an income, they would first be asked a one-shot question as to 
whether they even received income from that source. If the respondent answered no, they would 
continue to the next segment of the questionnaire with a missing value imputed. After making 
the dummy variables and a set of per capita variables (to reflect average household per capita 
income for those who earned the income source), missing values were set to zero, to indicate that 
the respondents earned R10 0 from the income source. 
In my final set of analyses, I restrict the analysis to the African population and then 
consider the decomposition of income sources contributing to total inequality among households 
above and below the poverty line, respectively. This uses the upper poverty line described in 
Statistics South Africa’s National Poverty Lines 2018 paper (Statistics South Africa, 2018). To 
make the decomposition comparable between 2008 and 2014, the poverty line outlined by 
Statistics South Africa was multiplied by the NIDS deflator to index it to a 2012 value to 
maintain consistency with the other data from the study set to 2012 real rand. This meant that the 
poverty line for 2008 in 2012 rand ended up being roughly R 1,119.9, while for 2014 the line in 
2012 rand was R 1067.4. While the poverty line used to determine which respondents were 
 
10 Note that a capital “R” followed by a value is used to denote rand, similarly to how a dollar sign ($) precedes 
values in the United States’ currency. R 0 thus means zero rand.  
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experiencing poverty did indeed change between the years, the shift was to accurately reflect the 
differences in the subgroup of households living in poverty.  
  
4. Results 
4.1: Broad income comparison of 2008 and 2014 
In Table 1 column 1, I set out to replicate the findings in Leibbrandt et al. (2012), 
reported in 2008 rand. The data do not exactly match those found in Leibbrandt et al. (2012), 
these numbers being off by roughly R +2 for the African income average, +17 for the Coloured 
average, -45 for the Asian/Indian average, -157 for the White average, and +3 for the overall 
average. The data’s similarity to the data of Leibbrandt et al. (2012) suggests that the small 
discrepancy is most likely a product of changes to the dataset over time such as shifting weights 
(which have been updated since this paper was published to reflect accurate census data) or other 
minor updates (including respondents who specified in a later survey their race after not 
answering in 2008, or who were recategorized).  
Columns 2 and 3 exclude rent and agriculture but are adjusted for inflation to allow for 
comparison between the two years. These columns serve as an extension of the work structured 
by Leibbrandt et al. (2012) who compared 1993 values with 2008, providing benchmark values 
for future studies.  
Central to Table 1 is the growth experienced by all races between Column 4 (2008) and 
Column 5 (2014) indicating that all races have experienced increased mean income even when 
adjusting for inflation. Africans experienced the largest growth in the time period (roughly a 
28.2% increase). This is especially interesting given the global financial crisis in 2008, during 
which the South African national economy was thrust into a recession (Rena, Ravinder, and 
Malindi Msoni, 2014). The high percentage of growth for African per capita income between 
2008 and 2014 could be either the result of government programs aimed at reducing inequality 
especially along racial lines succeeding11, or the result of more time having passed since the end 
of the apartheid regime for African entrance into the upper economic levels of the workforce 
from which they had previously been barred. Notably, the growth of Asian/Indian real per capita 
income was smallest, nearly stagnating while all other races experienced a larger increase in per 
capita income. This could be the result of starting from a wealthier vantage point at the end of 







Table 1: Income per capita mean for 2008 and 2014 excluding rent and agriculture and 
including rent and agriculture 
 
Mean income excluding imputed rent and 
agricultural income 
Mean of total income (including 
imputed rent and agricultural 
income) 
 
11 Such programs include land reforms and redistribution, increased allocation of funds to schools, and increased 
recipients of and budget for prominent social grants such as the Child Support Grant (Bhorat, Haroon, and Cassim, 
2014) that serves as a source of income for many South Africans each month.  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 2008* 2008 2014 2008 2014 
African 818.32 1340.80 1891.76 1545.94 2152.63 
Coloured 1398.11 2264.21 2680.39 2732.07 3112.08 
Asian/Indian 4243.63 6916.60 7085.10 8180.85 8195.54 
White 6118.59 9814.60 12130.04 11725.08 14219.93 
Overall 1459.85 2368.63 2936.59 2785.99 3384.81 
Per household per capita measure, deflator used to adjust to 2012 rand 
Source: NIDS Wave 1 and own calculations 
*unadjusted data; no deflator used in this column of calculations  
 
The data from Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1, including the 2008 and 2014 mean of total 
per capita income, can be used to generate Lorenz curves and by extension Gini coefficients for 
the different races. Figures 1 and 2 reflect the inequalities of total per capita income distribution 
by race in 2008 and 2014 respectively. In Figure 1, the 2008 Lorenz curve, two lines stand out: 
the line for African households which is the most unequal by far with a relatively small middle 
class and significant uptick for the final quintile, and the line representing the White racial group 
which is the most equal of the curves represented (as can be seen by its proximity to a 45-degree 
line). Comparatively, the Gini coefficient for Africans for total per capita income is 0.60, while 
the Gini coefficient for Whites is 0.4712. This suggests that while Whites have a higher average 
per capita income (Table 1), that income is also more evenly distributed. Africans having a lower 
per capita income and such an unequal spread on the Lorenz curve suggests that relatively few 
Africans are high-income earners. Combined with the data of mean per capita income from 
Table 1, this suggests that the majority of African households in 2008 are low-income earners, 
while a few higher earners are causing the higher average income.  
 
 
12 For context, according to the World Bank, Brazil had a Gini coefficient of 53.9 in 2018, the United States had a 
Gini coefficient of 41.4 in 2016, and Sweden had a Gini coefficient of 28.8 in 2017. 
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Figure 1: Lorenz Curve for Total Household Income Per Capita by Race, 2008
 
Source: NIDS Wave 1 and own calculations 
 
Most striking about Figure 2 is the increase in inequality among all races. Whites faced 
the largest of the increases, growing from a Gini coefficient of 0.47 to 0.63. This stands out as 
notable, especially due to the 2008 recession, and could be a factor of Whites continuing to earn 
significant amounts of money at higher levels, even as working-class Whites with less education 
dealt with pay cuts.13 Inequality among the Asian/Indian population also increased from 0.56 to 
0.59, a small shift that suggests the community may have benefitted from starting from a higher 
vantage point within the economy before the 2008 financial crisis. For the Coloured population 
as well, inequality rose from 0.53 to 0.58; the smaller increase in inequality either the result of 
fewer Coloured people represented in upper earning tiers or the result of successful affirmative 
action and government subsidy programs. Indeed, African inequality stayed relatively consistent 
in the time period, changing from 0.605 to 0.601. This result could be considered a success of the 
programs in preventing rising inequality amidst the turmoil of 2008, but also a failure of the 
programs as they did not do much to reduce inequality. Overall, the shift towards inequality for 
all races except for Africans seems to indicate that government policies to reduce inequality have 
been largely ineffective at achieving substantial reductions in income inequality, though the 
policies could have helped mitigate some of the economic impacts of the 2008 crash on the 
African community.  
 
 
13 NIDS also notably faced a low White response rate when conducting the survey, meaning that the small sample 
size could be a factor behind the drastic shift in the Gini coefficient if a certain demographic of the White population 
were less likely to participate.  
8




Figure 2: Lorenz Curve for Total Household Income Per Capita by Race, 2014
 
Source: NIDS Wave 4 and own calculations 
 
4.2: Decomposing income inequality by income source for 2008 and 2014 
 Table 2 presents a decomposition by income sources for 2008 using the income 
categories created by the household NIDS variables and adjusted to 2012 real per capita rand.  
Government income stands out as having the lowest Gini coefficient both for households 
receiving the income and for the overall population. The data show that the many people who 
relied on government income gain little from it, thus the reason behind the lower Gini 
coefficient.  
In contrast to government income, wage income had a Gini coefficient of 0.69 for those 
earning wage income.14 While the average household income for those receiving was R 2674.63, 
this number is most likely the result of only a few high-earning wage earners with the rest of the 
population relegated to whatever minimums (if any) are established by their labor union. A total 
of 68.42% of households received some income from wages, and wage income was unequally 
distributed across households regardless of whether they received the income or not. This 
suggests that the problem is less with households having access to wage-earning opportunities, 
but rather an unequal distribution within the opportunities that exist.  
Agricultural income exhibited the highest Gini coefficient in both categories of Gini 
coefficients, indicating that agriculture was a highly unequal form of income. Even so, it is a 
relatively small percent share in total income despite the nearly one-fifth of households that 
received it. Though some relied on agriculture for income, what they made was both relatively 
little and highly unequal in distribution. The inequality is understandable given the history of 
apartheid, in which land was forcibly removed from Africans and given to white farmers to 
 
14 The Gini coefficients presented here are similar in magnitude to those of Hundenborn et al. (2016). Any 
differences can likely be accounted for by weight updates and potential differences in the construction of aggregate 
income variables.  
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aggregate in large farms. With modern efforts to redistribute land, under a willing-buyer willing-
seller model, land redistribution efforts have been slow and ultimately limited in scope. Even 
efforts to return stolen land are difficult, as the majority of successful land settlements involve 
urban land with monetary compensation, not the return of the land (Hall, 2004).  
 
Table 2: Decomposition of Gini coefficients by income source, 2008 
Income 
Source: 


























Wages 71.27% 2674.63 1906.29 68.42% 0.69 0.78 
Government 59.98% 286.11 171.60 6.16% 0.45 0.67 
Remittances 15.20% 654.87 99.55 3.57% 0.80 0.97 
Imputed 
Rent 85.63% 484.48 414.88 14.89% 0.73 0.78 
Investment 7.17% 2475.69 177.62 6.38% 0.70 0.98 
Agriculture 17.91% 13.91 2.49 0.09% 0.91 0.99 
Other 2.37% 573.30 13.56 0.49% 0.74 0.99 
Total   2785.99 100.00% 0.68 0.69 
Per household per capita measure, with weights, and deflator used to adjust to 2012 rand 
Source: NIDS Wave 1 and own calculations 
 
Table 3 in 2014 finds that many of the income source inequality patterns observed in 
2008 persist. While the Gini coefficient for households receiving wage income decreased from 
0.69 in 2008 to 0.66 in 2014, the mean household income for those receiving wage income 
increased R 555.79 over the same time period. This is demonstrative of wage-based reforms such 
as minimum wages being implemented alongside an increase in wages for high-earning 
individuals. Important industries such as mining, domestic work, and agriculture experienced 
increases in the minimum wage between 2008 and 2014.  
Government income remained a key driver of alleviating income inequality in 2014. The 
proportion of households receiving government income fell minimally and the average amount 
received increased relative to 2008. The associated Gini coefficient for households receiving and 
for overall households declined slightly as well. All told, this demonstrates that the redistributive 
effect of government income to subsidize households in need continued through the time period. 
Indeed, as seen in my data, payouts for one of the biggest sources of government income--the 
Child Support Grant--had increasing payouts over the years between 2008 and 2014 (Webb and 
Vally, 2020). 
Thirdly, investment income nearly doubled the mean income for households receiving. In 
addition, the Gini coefficient for households receiving investment income increased from 0.70 in 
2008 to 0.89 in 2014. One explanation is that despite the issues facing South Africa’s economy 
10




after the global stock market crash of 2008, investment opportunities have become increasingly 
lucrative for the few wealthy patrons able to invest heavily, while for smaller investors payouts 
have decreased.  
The paper by Hundenborn et al. (2016) using NIDS data found similar marginal 
decreases in the Gini coefficients for wage and government income, while also noting the 
increase of investment usage over time. Hundenborn then applied the analysis of inequality for a 
comparison between 1993, 2008, and 2014 without looking at racially disaggregated patterns, 
while in the next component of my research I further decompose my study of inequality into 
subsections of the African population.  
Finally, to have the most accurate information, for Table 3, two totals were included for 
income. The first of these totals is the total reported income from the questionnaire. For those 
who didn’t respond, the data was cleaned to set their answer to zero, as this most often meant 
they skipped that series of questions and thus did not qualify to answer. Some, however, may 
have skipped this question out of a disinterest in answering rather than a lack of receiving the 
income. Using other sections of either the individual or household surveys, many of these 
answers could be later imputed. The “Total 2” row includes values that are taken from using the 
aggregate of imputed income, rather than just the response values. Because the 2014 wave of 
NIDS happened relatively recently, imputations have not been made across all income sources, 
meaning that in the “Total 1” category, 252 respondents ended up with zero income, as there 
were no imputations made to correct the data. For this paper, moving forward only “Total 1” will 
be used for calculations, as this is the total that allows for the reported variables of income 
sources to be used. Note that “Total 1” does include imputed rent, however, the rest of the 
variables are merely reported and not imputed, as the imputations have not been derived yet. 
Unlike the 2014 wave, Wave 1 from 2008 has been released long enough that these imputations 
were made, however, given time the breakdown of income sources with imputations will also be 
released.  
Between the two total variables, Total 2 has a lower Gini, which suggests that many of 
the imputations were made to adjust for an underreporting most severe among low-income 
households, as Total 2 is more equal than Total 1. Even so, the change is minor enough that for 















Table 3: Decomposition of Gini by income source, 2014 
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source for all 
HHs: 
Wages 68.05% 3230.42 2198.15 64.94% 0.66 0.77 
Government 58.38% 340.23 198.62 5.87% 0.40 0.65 
Remittances 23.47% 446.50 104.81 3.10% 0.59 0.90 
Imputed Rent 86.10% 512.61 441.37 13.04% 0.73 0.77 
Investment 7.33% 5872.13 430.52 12.72% 0.89 0.99 
Agriculture 7.17% 95.55 6.85 0.20% 0.88 0.99 
Other 9.16% 489.89 4.49 0.13% 0.60 1.00 
Total   3384.81 100.00% 0.66 0.68 
Total 2 [with 
imputations]   4017.17   0.66 
Per household per capita measure, with weights, and deflator used to adjust to 2012 rand 
Source: NIDS Wave 4 and own calculations 
 
4.3: Decomposing income inequality for African households above and below the poverty 
line in 2008 and 2014 
Table 4 presents the decomposition analysis for African households above and below the 
poverty line. Among households above the poverty line wage income exhibited both high 
elasticity and high correlation with total income, suggesting that not only does wage income 
increase overall inequality but it also is a large driver of total income inequality. A larger share 
of the total income comes from wages among households above the poverty line compared to 
those below the poverty line. In the subgroup above the poverty line, the Gini coefficients for the 
wage income overall and those receiving the wage income are relatively similar, suggesting that 
most inequality from the wages doesn't arise from non-earners but rather the drastic differences 
in income.  
The government income share below the poverty line is nearly ten times that above, 
which reflects the redistributive nature of government income. The negative elasticity held by 
government income both above and below the poverty line emphasizes its position as a 
redistributive source, as increases in government income would cause a decrease in the overall 
Gini coefficient. The impact of changes in governmental income would be powerful especially 
below the poverty line, where the negative elasticity is approximately twice that of the negative 
elasticity above the poverty line. The government income above the poverty line also has a 
negative correlation with total income while below the poverty line the correlation is positive, 
thus reflecting how government income decreases the total Gini coefficient in the above category 
while increasing it in the lower. This makes sense, as those above the poverty line would become 
less economically stratified with government income, whereas since those below the poverty line 
are competing for resources from the same fund, an increase in funding would only increase 
inequality in one of the most important forms of income.  
12




Imputed rent in both categories holds a positive correlation with the total income, 
suggesting that it is (especially for the subgroup above the poverty line) a fairly strong indicator 
of inequality while (as can be seen in the negative elasticity present in both groups) still slightly 
decreasing overall inequality. The Gini coefficient for those receiving imputed rent above the 
poverty line is much higher than the Gini coefficient in the same category for those below, 
suggesting increased inequality for imputed rent above the poverty line (perhaps due to a greater 
diversity of housing for those above the poverty line).  
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Above Poverty Line       
 Wages 79.09% 0.5439 0.5514 0.0916 0.9190 
 Government 3.84% 0.8034 0.8067 -0.0632 -0.3602 
 Remittances 3.08% 0.9555 0.9562 -0.0048 0.3950 
 
Imputed 
Rent 11.34% 0.6093 0.6837 -0.0218 0.5294 
 Investment 1.35% 0.5959 0.9726 -0.0025 0.3766 
 Agriculture 0.10% 0.9233 0.9911 -0.0018 -0.3085 
 Other 1.20% 0.7535 0.9873 0.0024 0.5456 
 Total 100.00%  0.4480 0.0000 1.0000 
At and Below Poverty 
Line       
 Wages 36.82% 0.4012 0.6717 0.1984 0.6995 
 Government 36.56% 0.3797 0.5167 -0.1333 0.3754 
 Remittances 5.71% 0.4994 0.9138 -0.0002 0.3328 
 
Imputed 
Rent 18.87% 0.4434 0.4836 -0.0723 0.3896 
 Investment 1.01% 0.4764 0.9845 0.0120 0.6801 
 Agriculture 0.51% 0.8986 0.9726 -0.0035 0.0999 
 Other 0.52% 0.3965 0.9901 -0.0010 0.2469 
 Total 100.00%  0.3031 0.0000 1.0000 
Per household per capita measure, with weights, and deflator used to adjust to 2012 rand 
Source: NIDS Wave 1 and own calculations 
 
In 2014, perhaps the most significant developments revealed by the data were the relative 
consistency of the wage Gini coefficients for those both above and below the poverty line, even 
as government income grew less unequal (especially for the subgroup above the poverty line). 
The minimal change seen in the Gini coefficients for wage data in both sets of African subgroups 
parallels the trend in the overall population described by Tables 3 and 4, where both wage Gini 
coefficients remained largely unaffected despite slight shifts in those receiving and the amount 
they received. The slight growth of government income as a share of total income for the 
14




population of 3.8% to 5.2% indicates growing redistributive efforts to combat wage-driven 
inequalities. Even so, government efforts to reduce inequality would ideally be targeted at wages.  
Despite reforms to minimum wage, the Gini coefficient of wages and the overall Gini 
coefficient for Africans above the poverty line remain high and are similar values. Between 2008 
and 2014, many of South Africa’s industries increased the minimum wage, including the mining 
sector (2014), the domestic work sector (annually 2008-2014),  and the agricultural work sector 
(annually 2009-2014). Raising minimum wages could have indeed been a factor in the decrease 
in Gini coefficient for Africans receiving wage income above the poverty line, as those who 
earned wage income now earned with the new minimum in place15. In contrast, between 2008 
and 2014 the inequality among all households below the poverty line for the wage Gini 
increased, which could be a result of the minimum wage forcing workers out of the workforce as 





















15 This assumes that those above the poverty line are impacted by the minimum wages. South Africa’s economy has 
shifted towards skilled labor in industries such as manufacturing and technology, which is more likely to be 
composed of those with connections to jobs, education, and land (Banerjee, A, Galiani, S, Levinsohn, J, McLaren, Z 
& Woolard, I, 2008).  
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Table 5: Decomposition of income sources for African households above and below the 




























Above Poverty Line       
 Wages 75.03% 0.5241 0.5821 0.1234 0.9231 
 Government 5.21% 0.4498 0.6994 -0.0814 -0.3701 
 Remittances 4.57% 0.5662 0.8867 -0.0302 0.1768 
 
Imputed 
Rent 10.70% 0.6223 0.6834 -0.0266 0.5071 
 Investment 4.08% 0.7184 0.9720 0.0174 0.6778 
 Agriculture 0.19% 0.8387 0.9891 -0.0012 0.1757 
 Other 0.23% 0.5961 0.9935 -0.0015 0.1674 
 Total 100.01%  0.4614 0.0000 1.0000 
At and Below Poverty 
Line       
 Wages 28.10% 0.3744 0.7242 0.1598 0.6797 
 Government 39.93% 0.3182 0.5111 -0.0682 0.5091 
 Remittances 9.91% 0.4340 0.8539 0.0215 0.4471 
 
Imputed 
Rent 20.22% 0.4835 0.5099 0.0017 0.2454 
 Investment 0.98% 0.3028 0.9863 0.0047 0.4720 
 Agriculture 0.71% 0.7366 0.9725 0.0021 0.4165 
 Other 0.15% 0.3109 0.9980 -0.1215 0.6742 
 Total 100.00%  0.3138 0.0000 1.0000 
Per household per capita measure, with weights, and deflator used to adjust to 2012 rand 
Source: NIDS Wave 4 and own calculations 
 
Additionally, the Gini coefficient for government income for African households 
receiving government income nearly halved, going from 0.8034 in 2008 to 0.4498 in 2014, while 
the overall government income Gini coefficient for the subgroup above the poverty line 
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decreased from 0.8067 to 0.699416. This corresponds to an increase in government grants in the 
wake of the 2008 recession (Bhorat et al., 2014). 
The largest of the South African government grants is the Child Support Grant (CSG) 
(Ibid.), with 71% of children receiving such grants, the income going to their households to fund 
care and education. The CSG was expanded in 2010 to include support for children until age 18 
instead of the previous cutoff of 15 in 2008, giving payouts to roughly 2.5 million more children 
in 2012 than it did in 2008, alongside a R50 increase in payment size (Department of Social 
Development, South African Social Security Agency, and United Nations Children’s Fund, 
2012). The raising of the age to allow for greater coverage meant that roughly 1 million more 
children received the grant in 2010 than in 2009 (Department for Social Development et al., 
2012). Calculations by Christopher Webb and Natasha Vally (2020) suggest that the child 
support grant has on average increased 5.5% each year 2010-2019, with some years slightly 
above or below this mean. This confirms data presented in this paper: that indeed government 
support has been increasing, and it has been serving as a redistributive form of income for many 
below the poverty line.  
Despite the increase in funding, however, a study by Leibbrandt, Woolard, Finn, and 
Argent (2010) found that many families in need remain ineligible for grants due to the increased 
documentation required to receive CSGs in particular that began in 2008. Hundenborn et al. 
(2016) corroborated data from this paper in a 2016 working paper similarly high levels of 
continuing inequality between 2008 and 2014, again citing Leibbrandt et al. (2010) and the 
patchy dispersion of grants as a potential reason for the persistent inequality despite increases in 
government spending.  
Ultimately, the shifts in the decomposition of African households both above and below 
the poverty level suggest that while increased efforts have been made to reduce inequality via 
governmental income, the initiatives have been insufficient as a result of not reaching enough of 
the individuals below the poverty line who need the income most.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 Noting trends in the series of data presented in this paper is key to understanding the 
dynamics and evolution of income inequality in South Africa in 2008 and 2014. The first section 
demonstrated that all races saw an increase in mean per capita income. Of the races, Africans 
experienced the largest percent growth in mean income, while mean incomes for Asians/Indians 
nearly stagnated. This could be indicative of the success of affirmative action policies or 
redistribution efforts. Alternatively, the stagnation of Gini coefficients for African households 
suggests that the growth experienced in mean income might instead be the result of the labor 
unions’ increased wage income in the absence of a matching increase in government 
redistribution efforts. Between 2008 and 2014, African households experienced a marginal 
decrease in income inequality. Consequently, Africans were the most unequal race in 2008, 
 
16 Interestingly, in the study by Hundenborn et al. (2016), the Gini coefficient remained relatively constant for 
government income of the overall population, going from 0.776 in 2008 to 0.758 in 2014. Though this contradicts 
the numbers I calculated (0.67 in 2008 and 0.65 in 2014), it still remains notable, as both sets of numbers exhibit 
relatively little change. One explanation for the discrepancies is the definition of what grants were included in 
government income. Regardless, the stagnation is important to note when compared to the fluctuations of the Gini 
coefficient for Africans below the poverty line. Hundenborn et al. (2016) also found similar trends of negative 
elasticity between government income and the total Gini coefficient, emphasizing the nature of government income 
as redistributive. Again, however, the findings of Hunderborn et al. are for the overall population not for any racial 
subgroups or a breakdown of those above/below the poverty line.  
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while whites were the most unequal race in 2014. While government efforts at redistribution may 
have succeeded in staving off a greater increase in inequality during the 2008 recession, they 
haven’t made progress in overall income inequality seen among African households.  
Notably, the White mean income remained much higher than that of the other races, 
pointing to drastic inequalities between races that have remained despite the end of apartheid. 
The most significant of the Gini coefficient increases was also for White households, perhaps as 
a result of the 2008 recession.  
The income decomposition revealed low government Gini coefficients in both 2008 and 
2014, suggesting that government income has become a redistributive measure. This stands in 
contrast to the high wage Gini coefficient for both years. Because wage income is a large share 
in overall income, wages most likely increased the overall Gini coefficient for the population. 
The stark contrast between the government and wage measures reveals the tension at the heart of 
South African inequality: efforts to redistribute income in the smaller allotments that the 
government is able, contrasted with the few high wage earners driving inequality.  
 Finally, decomposing for African households above and below the poverty line revealed 
a divide in wage income, with a higher share and more inequality found in the section above the 
poverty line. The Gini coefficient for wage income had a relatively high correlation in both years 
to the total Gini coefficient, suggesting again that the relationship between wage income and 
overall inequality has persisted over time for African households both above and below the 
poverty line, perhaps due to the presence of labor unions or a failure of government reform. 
Additionally, government income served in both years as a higher share of income for those 
below the poverty line than for those above it, and the negative elasticity between government 
income and the overall Gini coefficient further emphasized the redistributive effect of South 
Africa’s welfare program.  
Gini coefficients were an effective way to measure inequality for this study as they 
capture the broader picture of inequality while allowing for further decomposition. The 
subsequent decomposition allows for a better understanding of what subgroups experience the 
most inequalities and what income sources are driving such inequities. The continual theme 
reflected throughout the data suggests that government income has been an important method of 
redistributing income and preventing a further rise in inequalities, while the wage inequalities 
remained relatively consistent over time, most likely due to the influence of labor unions.  
The findings of this paper complement and extend those found in past papers of 
Hudnenborn et al. (2016) and Leibbrandt et al. (2000) by replicating data showing the inequality 
of wage income and extending analyses for subgroups of Africans above and below the poverty 
line. My paper allows for a more detailed and complex look at inequality due to the breakdown 
of racial category (an important acknowledgment given the history of apartheid) and the 
decomposition for African households, which serves as useful for future policies designed to 
target African households and help alleviate the unequal burden of apartheid’s legacy. 
Additionally, this paper differs from the study by Hunderborn et al. (2016) based 
uponLeibbrandt et al. (2012) as my paper also offers insight into agricultural income and 
imputed rent.  
While other studies have also focused on non-monetary measures of inequality, this study 
focuses on income as it is similar between years and does not shift with developing technology. 
Even so, it is important to recognize the contribution of other non-monetary measures of 
deprivation. While no direct effects of particular policies or efforts were studied, the 
decompositions within this paper remain helpful to consider for future studies and policies that 
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target inequality, especially the inequality rampant along racial lines and present between 
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